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I. Self-Organisation in Performance. An Extensive Introduction
In the middle of the many social and political struggles, which have come to define large parts of 
the early-21st century stream of events, experimental performing arts in Europe too have been 
undergoing quite remarkable changes of their socio-political compositions. Subsidy cuts, the 
attempted closings and privatisations of theatre venues, the institutions’ further expansion of their 
control-oriented operative models of co-production and curation, or the ongoing degradation of 
women, people of colour, and other non-male, non-white identifying subjects in rehearsals and on 
stage—these and further trends in European theatre, dance, and performance have not gone 
unnoticed, to say the least. Quite on the contrary, practitioners have met the multiple challenges 
with the active engagement in a wide range of projects aiming for the creation of distinct socio-
political alternatives, no matter how much of a preliminary or partial solution they might pose. 
A necessarily incomplete list of initiatives would have to include at least some of the following 
names and spaces:  
There is PAF, for example, the Performing Arts Forum in St. Erme, Northern France, which was 
founded by Jan Ritsema and colleagues in 2005 and has since been upheld by a wide number of 
temporary inhabitants who all together continuously engage in non-institutionally framed, 
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autonomous, and inclusive production and discourse; similar residency spaces for collective 
working include Massia, PAF’s offspring in Massiaru, Estonia, and the Bidston Observatory in the 
United Kingdom. A more aggressive tactics of direct intervention has been the motor for theatre 
occupations all over Europe, two of them being the 2011 occupation of Embros Theatre in Athens, 
which, despite phases of severe internal conflict, can look back at years of sustained social and 
artistic practice, and the group VB 61-12’s occupation of Volksbühne in 2017, which, although short-
lived, sparked public debate around the political agency of a theatre in a rapidly changing city like 
Berlin and fostered continuing exchange in social media forums. Still other initiatives have been 
providing tools for the establishing of social infrastructures necessary for mutual exchange in the 
artistic communities, as there are, for example, the online and physical sharing platforms 
Everybody’s Toolbox and Nobody’s Business, which organised and keep organising artist meetings 
in various studios and theatre places from different countries, keeping detailed records of their 
activities on their websites so as to make results available for everyone.  
Staying with examples like these, it is interesting to observe that the majority of them has in 
common not only a decisively radical political positioning, but also, and more specifically, the 
strong affirmation of the practice and concept of self-organisation. Their engagement in self-
organising principles varies according to the specific aims and needs of each situation: it might 
take on the form of weekly general assemblies as in the case of Embros, it might consist in the 
collective programming and realisation of a daily schedule as in the Volksbühne occupation, or it 
might involve the commitment to the three rules “don’t leave traces,” “make it possible for others,” 
and “the do-er decides” as in PAF (cf. Ritsema/Desideri 2016). It might also come with different 
languages and vocabularies, ranging from the use of contemporary keywords such as “open-
source” and “sharing” (cf. Nobody’s Business, n.d.), to framing programmes as “self-initiated” and 
“ad-hoc” (cf. Bidston Observatory 2018), to explicitly referencing the notion of self-organisation on 
the occasions of lectures and essays (cf. Ritsema 2017; Argyropoulou 2017). The unifying 
momentum of all these options, however, is that they are being pursued with the intention of 
bringing forth a space and culture of equal and equally freeing relations, which is to say that at the 
heart of these projects is the commitment to self-organisation as a commitment to social and 
artistic liberation. And most importantly perhaps, in several cases, existing ideas of self-
organisation are less applied than experimented with, Everybody’s inventions of scores and tasks 
for different modes and relations of exchange serving as just one example of the generally non-
orthodox approach to self-organisation.  
The engagement in and experimentation with self-organisation can thus be said to be among the 
most generative of socio-political activities in the experimental European performing arts scenes 
these days. Assuming that this diagnosis about the importance of self-organisation is correct, there 
is the potential for many subsequent enquiries. Relevant questions might address the historical 
lineage of self-organisation in performing arts—the neo avant-gardes, Living Theatre, or the 
Frankfurter “Mitbestimmungsmodell” ranging among the possible references—or the contextual 
similarities and differences between self-organisation in performing arts and self-organisation 
simultaneously being practiced in the non-artistic realm of political action—the so called anti-
globalisation movement and Occupy Wall Street as the most obvious references in this latter case 
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(cf. for example Graeber 2002). For the purpose of this paper, I decided to choose a different 
option, though, namely to invest less in a contextualisation or analysis of performing arts self-
organisation, and more in a theoretical response. This response-led methodology is stimulated by 
several concerns, the most important one perhaps being that any conventional analysis as a writing 
about, however valuable it might be, risks to execute, if only on the level of language, precisely what 
self-organisation most often tries to escape, namely an act of subjection or objectification. The 
format of the theoretical response, instead, is more of a writing in relation to and a writing for, a 
writing, which tries to contribute to the raised issue by adding to it in its very own conceptual terms, 
aiming to produce knowledge that might eventually benefit those who the writing originally 
responded to. In other words, I will not, over the next couple of pages, dissect or come back to any 
of the just mentioned experiments from the performing arts, but I will develop a discussion of the 
concept, or rather the concepts of self-organisation relevant for them and their further unfolding, 
and I will do so not least by adapting a likewise somewhat experimental approach.  
More concretely, I will deploy a particular fictional narrative with a history of almost three hundred 
years in order to intertwine with and through it three existing concepts of self-organisation. The 
narrative in question is the pirate-utopia Libertatia, and the concepts in question are anarchist, 
cybernetic, and vitalist-materialist self-organisation. The choice of these specific concepts is 
motivated by mainly three factors: first, they are historically and theoretically among the most 
dominant concepts in the more general discourse on self-organisation, although many other, often 
related accounts from biology, feminist theory, the black radical and further radically leftist 
traditions have equally proven to be insightful (for recent examples cf. Haraway 2016; Lorey 2015, 
chapter “Care Crisis and Care Strike”; Moten/Harney 2013; Berardi 2017); second, they are to some 
extent historically interconnected—research on anarchism, for example, having shown that the 
surfacing of the precise notion of self-organisation in anarchist discourse is most probably owed 
to the publication of a cybernetic paper in an anarchist journal from the 1960s, which led to a 
change in the very anarchist understandings of social developments (cf. Schaupp 2017; Duda 2013; 
McEwan 1963); third, all of them are in some ways present in the performing arts discourse, with 
Jan Ritsema (cf. 2017), for example, having mentioned anarchist self-organisation and anarchist 
writer Hakim Bey’s related concept of the temporary autonomous zone (cf. 1991) among his 
influences, and Gigi Argyropoulou from Embros (cf. 2017, 2018) having often quoted from Tiqqun, 
or the Invisible Committee, as they called themselves later on, a collective that is closely aligned 
with anarchist discourse and which is well known not least for its fierce criticism of cybernetics (cf. 
Tiqqun 2001; Invisible Committee 2015).  
I should add that my choice of references from within anarchism, cybernetics, and vitalist 
materialism is certainly selective: in the case of anarchism, I will focus on the social libertarian 
heritage (for an overview see cf. Chomsky 1970), and particularly on Mikhail Bakunin and Emma 
Goldman, whereas I will ignore, for example, individualist approaches emanating from Max Stirner 
(cf. [1844] 1995), which have regained importance in some of the recent post-anarchist debates (cf. 
Newman 2016; for post-anarchism and its critique cf. Süreyyya/Rousselle 2011; Cohn 2002; 
Cohn/Wilbur 2003). For cybernetics, I will mainly refer to second generation authors William Ross 
Ashby and Heinz von Foerster, and for vitalist materialism, I will quote from Félix Guattari. The 
 
549 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
choice of the narrative of Libertatia, in turn, is motivated by the fact that its several reiterations 
over the course of the centuries—involved authors including Charles Johnson, Don Carlos Seitz, 
William S. Burroughs, and the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit—have made it somewhat of a 
palimpsest which encompasses all three concepts of self-organisation, and namely in a way that 
allows me to perform the intended twists in interpretation or the slightly heretical reading that I 
aim for.  
The hypothesis that I wish to develop is that in all three forms of anarchist, cybernetic, and vitalist-
materialist self-organisation can be found very subtle or sometimes rather obvious clues 
suggesting that self-organisation is not just incidentally, but necessarily being accompanied by its 
very opposite of self-dis-organisation. In other words, the story of Libertatia can help display that 
self-organisation necessarily brings about its very own subversion, and precisely this surplus 
aspect can be understood not as a weakness, but as the defining quality of self-organisation 
enabling change, change that is always, first of all, self-change, as one might say, and change, that, 
in this function, serves as the very prerequisite for social liberation. This specific accentuation of 
the concept of self-organisation ideally indicates the essential value of the discussion of self-
organising principles for performing arts practice in the present and, probably, the years to come. 
II. The Stories of Libertatia. A Combined Narrative 
“One world—one love:—LIBERTATIA”—so goes the refrain to the eponymous single “Libertatia” 
released by Berlin based indie band Ja, Panik in 2014, a post-ironic and playfully naïve prayer of 
hope for a different future, which represents probably the most recent of references to Libertatia 
from pop-cultural and literary discourse; and while it is probably nothing but a happy coincidence 
that the band’s name Ja, Panik evokes the very motif of panic that resides deep within the tale of 
Libertatia (an aspect that I will discuss in my conclusion), it is definitely not a coincidence that 
Libertatia, in Ja, Panik’s song, finds itself to be the subject of yet another retelling of its story. After 
all, the very first formulation of Libertatia was in itself already a reiteration: in the late 1720s 
namely, when Charles Johnson (cf. 1728) delivered the original account of Libertatia in the second 
volume of his “History of the Pyrates,” he expressively did so on the basis of another alleged 
document, namely a manuscript from so called French Captain Misson, or Mission, as the English 
translation has it, who is at the same time the protagonist of the story. It has long been debated 
whether, since the “History of the Pyrates” is an otherwise historical account of actual 17th-century 
pirate events, the reports of Mission could equally be regarded as true, but recent research 
strongly suggests that Libertatia never existed (cf. Little 2016), thus making the narrative a fiction 
with nevertheless surprisingly apt historical and geographical coordinates, locating Libertatia on 
the island of Madagascar in the time around the late-17th, early-18th century.  
Despite being situated in this early modern period, which predated the actual development of 
anarchist, cybernetic, or vitalist-materialist self-organising principles, already Johnson’s 
contribution contains various plot twists and key words that set the scene for the discussion of at 
least a proto-anarchist self-organisation. In the early 20th century then, Don Carlos Seitz (cf. [1925] 
2012), upon rediscovering the “History of the Pyrates,” drafted what is essentially a short summary 
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of Johnson’s account on Libertatia, however not without making some minor adjustments, which 
led to a significant deepening of the anarchist traits of the story. Precisely some of these alterations 
later reappeared in William S. Burroughs’ substantial adaptions of Libertatia in two of his novels 
and a short story, all of which were published in the period between the early 1980s to the early 
1990s (cf. 1991, 1987, 1981). More importantly, however, Burroughs added entirely new characters 
and plot lines to the existing narrative, thus introducing not only vitalist-materialist ideas of self-
organisation to Libertatia, but allowing also for speculation about cybernetic self-organisation in 
its various forms. The latter was further unfolded by the CCRU or Cybernetic Culture Research Unit 
in a text from the turn of the century (cf. 2017), in which they referenced still another source going 
by the name of William Kane, a mysterious character, who maintained that, due to the circular 
effects of a cybernetic folding in time, Burroughs’ writing on Libertatia had landed in the hands of 
no one other than Mission himself, the main character of the story thus having found himself in 
the odd situation of reading about his actions before they had even occurred. Additionally, the 
CCRU reevaluated the literary status of the narrative by holding that Libertatia should be regarded 
not as a mere fiction, but as a report that was just as real as anything else; after all, from the 
hyperstitional standpoint that the CCRU persistently applied, reality itself was nothing but the 
condensed product of fictional events, and in that sense fiction and reality were to be regarded as 
internally related (for the concept of hyperstition in the CCRU cf. Ibid, 35–36). 
The combined narrative resulting from these many intertwined story tellings can be conceived of 
as an intricate general matrix for the discussion of self-organisation. In its most apparent form, it 
brings about two intertwined set of relations and events, the first of which could be entitled “the 
Sea as a Life,” a quote taken from Johnson’s original characterisation (1728, 2). In a scenario set 
around 1700, the high time of sovereign power, colonialism, and early capitalism, young Mission 
hired on the Victoire, a French man-o-war, which, in one of his first trips aboard, took Mission to 
Italy, where he got to know the young priest Caraccioli. The priest discovered a friend in Mission 
and, having been sickened from the hypocrisy of clerical power, immediately decided to join him 
on ship to go across the Atlantic to the Caribbean. The Victoire headed there to accompany a 
French merchant ship, which was commanded to travel to the island of Martinique, a transport 
mission like so many others from that time intended to ship goods, arms, and slaves around the 
globe.  
After having securely escorted the trading vessel to its destination, Mission, Caraccioli, and the rest 
of the crew found themselves in an engagement with an English battleship, which left all of the 
Victoire’s captains and lieutenants killed, an unforeseeable situation, which the remaining men 
quickly decided to use to their advantage by denouncing all ties to their French motherland and 
declaring their ship an independent “Republic of the Sea” (Seitz [1925] 2012, 20). Themselves, they 
gave the names of “liberty lovers” (Ibid.), declaring that, from now on, they were entirely devoted 
to a “Life of Liberty” (Johnson 1728, 13). In the following, Mission was declared the new captain, 
although his position came with no individual ruling power, but only with the task of executing the 
common decisions that the crew had collectively made via debates and direct votes. The rules that 
the new community imposed on itself determined that private possessions and all prizes from 
conquests were to be turned into common property, that hostile vessels were to be fought only 
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for self-defence or with the aim of winning just as much as was necessary for self-preservation, 
and that slaves from other vessels were to be freed and welcomed onto their ship without 
discrimination of either nationality or race. This, essentially, is what the first constellation of 
relations and events in the tale of Libertatia is comprised of, most of which is narrated by Johnson 
and Seitz: European imperialism including state and clerical sovereignty, movements on sea, the 
sudden absence of power, and a self-determining community with international and anti-capitalist 
scope. 
A second, more extensive scenery, which is largely introduced by Burroughs and the CCRU, comes 
into view once the sailors, after a long cruise from the Caribbean across the South Atlantic and 
down the western coast of Africa to the other side of the continent, voted to leave the life on the 
sea behind and settle down on the island of Madagascar. In a shift from the “Sea as a life” to a life 
on land or, one might say, the land as a life, Mission and his men founded, in a somewhat 
paradoxical move, the anti-colonial colony of “Libertatia,” or “Libertalia” as it is spelled in some 
cases (47). From now on referred to as the “Libertatians” (96), they installed their settlement on the 
northern coast of the island, with no intention of invading and conquering the rest of the territory, 
which had long been populated by a tribe of natives living further inland and the many unique 
animal species of Madagascar, among them the lemurs who predominantly occupied the forests. 
The lemurs were sacred beings in the eyes of the natives, a specific aspect that became crucially 
important one day when Martin, a member of Libertatia, killed a lemur, who, as he claimed, had 
stolen his mango. Not only did Martin single-handedly violate the liberty lovers’ law of common 
property by assuming that the fruit belonged exclusively to him, but more damningly, his killing of 
the sacred animal equalled war with the natives, which is why Mission, in his function as the captain 
and leader of Libertatia, immediately took action in expelling Martin from the community. That 
could not undo the harm that was caused, though, but quite on the contrary, the chain of events 
only accelerated, when Martin, now an outcast, made his way to the natives to inform them about 
the incident, without, however, disclosing that it was he who had killed the lemur, thus directing 
the natives’ anger at the other Libertatians. Mission, in a prophetic moment right after the 
expulsion of Martin, had foreseen that Martin would do exactly that, but suddenly having been 
overcome by a “paralyzing fatigue” (Burroughs 1987, 52), he immediately fell asleep, which 
rendered him unable to prevent Martin from spreading his lies among the native community. Soon, 
then, the Libertatians had to face the natives in a bloody battle; many people died and the fate of 
the colony was sealed. 
An extra level, however, is added to the story when it turns out that Martin actually did not act on 
his own, but was fulfilling the orders of the so called “custodians of the future” (Burroughs 1987, 
52), a secretive board hovering above events in order to guarantee that the status quo on the entire 
planet remained balanced, or that, more precisely, the “prerecorded and therefore totally 
predictable universe” (Ibid.) went its course without the slightest of frictions. The true name of this 
control regime was the “OGU,” the “One God Universe” (CCRU 2017, 37), implying that the 
custodians of the future were themselves only the delegates of a higher, transcendent power, 
namely God and his son Jesus Christ, who both represented the only substance and voice of 
everything that there was. Ultimately, it was in their name that the custodians sent Martin to 
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distract and destroy life in Libertatia, an intervention that had become necessary as the reality of 
the existence of a resolutely autonomous community defied the monocausal order of the OGU. 
Mission and his fellows’ experiment in self-sustained living might inspire others, the new form of 
living potentially being as contagious as a virus and altering the prearranged order of events, the 
custodians feared: “If three hundred man—then three thousand, thirty thousand. It could spread 
everywhere. It must be stopped now” (Burroughs 1987, 52, emphasis in original). 
As tragic as the custodians’ instructions to Martin turned out to be for the destiny of Libertatia, 
Mission himself, even before the colony was destroyed, had already directed his interests toward 
the creation of yet another community, namely an intimate and decisively peaceful bond with the 
lemurs. Spending more and more time in the forests, he tried to make direct contact with the 
primates, and thanks to an experienced native supplying him with a potent drug called Indris—its 
name signifying “look there” in native language (Ibid., emphasis in original)—he eventually managed 
to see the fleeting creatures, who otherwise remained invisible as they only needed to accept a 
discernible shape when they had to take a breath every once in a while. Finding a close companion 
in particularly one of them, Mission “often slept with the lemur beside him on his pallet, and had 
named the lemur Ghost” (Ibid.), which was the term that the natives had chosen to refer to the 
lemurs in general. Apart from the fact that they were mostly invisible, what justified this naming 
was not least that they participated in the realm of the “MU”, the “Magical Universe” of polyculture 
(CCRU 2017, 40), in which not only the monocausal order of the OGU, but also the hierarchy of the 
species, the chronology of time, and the human limits of language were left behind. Instead, life in 
the MU was characterised by a purely immanent process of forces of becoming, which had present, 
past, and future as well as all other categories of being continuously expand in contingent ways. 
While Mission discovered this cosmos, the battles between Libertatians and natives however 
increased, and eventually he had to realise that, for his own survival, he had to flee the island and 
sail back out into the sea, an escape that abruptly ended in the middle of a great storm, which 
buried him beneath the waves. Yet, whether this last known event marked the ultimate end of the 
Libertatian dream or perhaps just a transition toward another chapter of the story that remains to 
be told, is an option that depends entirely on the speculation sparked by the CCRU as to whether 
the waves of the sea might just as well be conceived as only a further expression of the tumultuous, 
immanent forces of life, Mission getting lost in the sea thus possibly representing an even more 
intimate bond with the MU (CCRU 2017, 52). 
In any case, the return of the powers of the sea can be said to represent both an opening as well 
as a return to the very beginnings of the stories of Libertatia, which is to say that the sea equally 
serves as a frame for the many additional sets of relations and events that unfolded in the long in-
between sequence on land. Individually recounted, they can be named in the form of an anti-
colonial colony, the orchestration of murder and war, a post-human community, and, more 
generally, a conflict between transcendent, monopolistic power and immanent, plural forces. In 
conjunction with the initial set of relations and events from aboard the ship, the resulting overall 
narrative spans an extremely vast array of political and social, religious and metaphysical, 
ecological and species-related matters, whose interrelations present a singular framework for the 
discussion of self-organisation that is at work within them. Most obviously, perhaps, it is the 
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anarchist tradition of self-organising principles that surfaces on several accounts, which is why I 
will focus on anarchist self-organisation first, before I will then seek to unravel the implications of 
the sometimes subtler references to cybernetic and vitalist-materialist self-organisation. 
III. Anarchist Self-(Dis-)Organisation. The Desire to Rebel 
Not long into the stories of Libertatia, anarchist self-organisation shines through in perhaps its 
clearest form. In the event on sea, when the Victoire’s battle with the English enemies led to the 
killing of all captains and lieutenants on board, the remaining men found themselves confronted 
with the sudden absence of not only their former leaders, but also the sovereign order that they 
represented and put in place. The resulting disorder brought about the chance for a  
re-organisation of social relations, an opportunity that the sailors immediately seized when they 
decided not to imitate any previous maxims, but to create a new form of organisation, which 
entailed that everyone had direct and equal voting rights while the appointed captain only had the 
right to execute the voting result. This distinct course of action aboard the Victoire represents in 
many ways an anticipation of the very nucleus of anarchist self-organisation, a parallel that 
becomes apparent by taking a look at the first systematic introduction of self-organising principles 
by Mikail Bakunin in the early anarchist days from the mid-19th century.  
Bakunin’s social libertarianism was grounded, first and foremost, on the utmost contempt for the 
modern state, a political institution, which, in his view, equalled the repression of the masses 
through a mechanism of top-down-governance characteristic for feudal, bourgeois, and Marxist 
state interpretations alike, which is to say that the order of representative parliamentarianism or 
any other popular representation was just as misguided as the order of the king. In either case, the 
state instituted a body of legislation that took decisions for the masses instead of letting them 
make decisions for themselves, even if, in its democratic variation, the people were given at least 
the right to elect those who were to make decisions for them. In a word, the rule of the state was 
necessarily defined by the rule of a few over the many, and it was this hierarchical and, more 
importantly, exclusionary relation that the “free organization” ([1873] 2005, 24) or “self-government 
of the commune” (206), as Bakunin called self-organisation at the time, was supposed to turn on 
its head: “no state,” Bakunin proclaimed, “howsoever democratic its forms, […] is capable of giving 
the people what they need: the free organization of their own interests from below upward, 
without any interference, tutelage, or coercion from above. This is because no state, not even the 
most republican and democratic, not even the pseudo-popular state contemplated by Marx, in 
essence represents anything but government of the masses from above downward, by an 
educated and thereby privileged minority which supposedly understands the real interests of the 
people better than the people themselves” (Ibid., 24). Hierarchy, to be precise, was not completely 
rejected in free organisation, but in crucial difference to the state, it was to manifest itself only in 
the form of an executive hierarchy, in which selected delegates in federations were directly bound 
to the choices of the many from within the communes. 
Regarding its underpinning socio-political mindset, anarchist self-organisation can be said to be an 
expression of what Bakunin called the “desire to rebel” ([1882] 1970, 9, emphasis in original), an 
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inherent human tendency never to accept any form of subordination, which in 1910 still resonated 
in Emma Goldman’s phrasing of the anarchist “spirit of revolt” ([1910] 1969, 63). On a side note, it 
should be noted that Bakunin’s characterisation of the desire to rebel as a natural instinct might 
be regarded as a form of essentialism (for such criticism cf. Newman 2016 and further references 
of post-anarchism), but a close reading of how he derived the concept from the myth of the Fall of 
Man, or more precisely from the insinuation of the snake (cf. [1882] 1970, 1–2), might stimulate the 
interpretation that the desire is to be seen as rather prompted, or “soufflé,” as Derrida would have 
it with Artaud (cf. Derrida [1978] 2001), and thus as much more of a construct than an essence. 
Regardless of such finesse, one of the most trenchant formulations of the anarchist desire or spirit 
is definitely owed to John Henry Mackay, him having once written a short aphorism, which figured 
as the epigraph of one of Goldman’s essays and which ends with the following words: “I am an 
Anarchist! Wherefore I will Not Rule, and also ruled I will not be!” (cf. Goldman [1910] 1969, 47). 
Whereas Mackay, in this exclamation, spoke in the singular form, the deeper social libertarian 
implications are, of course, that neither should anyone rule over the commune nor should the 
commune rule over anyone else, or differently put, neither should anyone rule over us, nor should 
we rule over anyone else. On that account, the “self” in self-organisation can be said to refer, first 
and foremost, to this very “we,” a self-determining we claiming that it is only they who should 
organise their ways of life, not any other superior power reigning from outside or above.  
The fact that the formation of such we presupposes not least an affective dimension has been 
highlighted perhaps most strongly in recent anarchist and anarchism-infused debates, the Invisible 
Committee, for example, having declared not without a touch of pathos that “[t]o organize is not 
to give a structure to weakness. It is above all to form bonds—bonds that are by no means 
neutral—terrible bonds. The degree of organization is measured by the intensity of sharing—
material and spiritual” (2009, 15, emphasis in original). There is no we, in other words, without 
social connections and ties based on a shared experience of intensity binding everyone involved 
together. 
The realisation of a rule from below, the desire to rebel, and the forming of affective connections 
all being more or less explicitly present in the “Republic on the Sea,” it seems that the tale of 
Libertatia provides an almost paradigmatic example of anarchist self-organisation, but a number 
of inconsistencies suggest that Libertatia is, at the very same time, its subversion, and this is where 
things start to get really interesting. For one thing, in Johnson’s early draft of Libertatia, Caraccioli, 
who, despite having fled the clergy, was still a firm believer, had the crew solemnly declare that 
they fight “A Deo a Libertate, for God and liberty” (1728, 16, emphasis in original). This implied that 
the “Republic of the Sea” was taken under the guidance of the Lord, but in anarchism, the figure of 
God most certainly does not promise liberty, as Caraccioli wanted to believe; instead, it is presented 
as just another transcendent power that is designed to infuse subordination. Bakunin insisted that 
the acceptance of the mere possibility of God contradicted human freedom, one of his most 
unapologetic theses, in this respect, reading that: “God being master, man is the slave” ([1882] 
1970, 24). Indeed, from his materialist standpoint, it was only logical to assume that the idea of 
God led to the degradation of everyone else, because if the omnipotent spirit was the primary 
source of all things, then all human beings, but also all other matter-bound beings necessarily had 
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to be secondary, inferior, and therefore unfree (cf. Ibid.; for a reaffirmation of this deduction cf. 
Goldman [1910] 1969, 53). It is only through Burroughs’ variation, then, that the stories of Libertatia 
implicitly realigned with this anarchist critique, namely when Burroughs decided to completely 
obliterate all positive references to God. 
More importantly, though, it is the further development on land that has the stories of Libertatia 
perform an alteration of anarchist self-organisation. Crucial impulses come from the murder of 
the lemur and subsequent events, that is, from Martin killing the monkey after he had allegedly 
stolen his mango, and Mission being unable to stop Martin from then spreading his lies about the 
murder among the natives. In initially equal ways, both Martin and Mission’s behaviours reveal 
how anarchist self-organisation, although intended to be a realisation of maximum social freedom, 
is nevertheless, in some sense, dependent on the limitation of the freedom of every member of 
the community or the community as a whole, and the specific way that this becomes apparent has 
to do with the fact that Martin and Mission both essentially display acts of failure: very concretely, 
in Martin violating the rule of common property and peaceful conduct, and in Mission violating his 
responsibility as a captain to not just condemn the murder, but also make sure that the danger of 
the murdering subject was contained, the two men failed to apply the rules of the colony to 
themselves, precisely this form of ex negativo affirmation indicating how much self-organisation is, 
despite all of its liberating intentions, still strongly based on governance or rule, only that the 
subject and object of rule are one and the same. Be it with regard to one or many, anarchist self-
organisation is likely to amount to a process of internalisation of power much rather than its 
deferral or absence, and this quality of internalisation can be named, quite specifically, with a 
notion otherwise used to denote a very different, bourgeois form of power, namely the notion of 
self-discipline (cf. Foucault 1977). The historical irony of this insight, then, is that anarchist self-
discipline is not entirely different from the discipline of their very enemies, the bourgeois class 
having represented, of course, one of their biggest counterparts in the time of the 19th and 20th 
century. 
Now, while this interpretation of Libertatia’s narrative suggests that its combined story undermines 
anarchist self-organisation in disclosing its intimate relation to power, the resulting argument of 
which would be that anarchist self-organisation equals order in a most rigid sense, the ultimate 
lesson that can be drawn from Libertatia is exactly the reverse; namely, anarchist self-organisation 
can indeed be extremely liberating, but only if it becomes porous vis-à-vis the more precise 
implications of its own failure, or of Mission’s failure, for that matter, which, at a closer look, has to 
be differentiated from that of Martin. The difference between them is that, despite both 
representing behaviours of non-discipline, Martin’s failure to discipline himself equaled him 
applying discipline or sheer brutal force against someone else, whereas Mission failed to exercise 
discipline or force no matter against whom. What Mission did was that, instead of forcing himself 
to act out against Martin, instead of perhaps violently preventing him from reaching the 
community of the natives, he gave in to a sudden fatigue, and thus, in simply accepting to fall 
asleep, he neither ruled against anyone else nor against himself.  
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Although it might be counter-intuitive, precisely this moment of sleep can be said to be the most 
radical and indeed the only logical consequence of anarchist self-organisation. After all, if anarchist 
self-organisation is fuelled by the desire to rebel, that is, if self-organisation is supposed to be the 
implementation of the refusal to rule no matter who or be ruled no matter by whom, then the only 
consistent interpretation of self-organisation is indeed that it must include the refusal to rule or be 
ruled not only by others, but also by the self—making the failure to discipline oneself the 
paradoxical completion of self-organisation. Thus, in the same way that anarchist self-organisation 
implies the folding of power, in the same way that it implies the identity of the subject and object 
of power, it equally implies the folding of the refusal of power, or the identity of the subject and 
object of the refusal of power, and of course, in its most immediate social-libertarian sense, this 
conclusion does not only concern the subject and object as an individual, but also the subject and 
object as a community. In short, this is how anarchist self-organisation is always already self-dis-
organisation, a programme that is paradoxically both a programme for the liberation of the self 
through organisation and a programme for the liberation of the self from organisation. 
Certainly, in the case of Mission, the individualist aspect of his complete refusal might suggest that 
at the centre of this paradoxical divide resides predominantly an unresolvable conflict between 
the many and the one, but again, the self in self-organisation and self-dis-organisation can refer to 
an individual just as well as it can refer to a community, and more importantly, it refers 
predominantly to the organisation within that self, not between different individual or collective 
selves. Finally, with respect to Mission, it is worth adding that his behaviour was guided not least 
by the impulse to go through the demise of Libertatia only to see the emergence of a wholly 
different community within the MU—and this latter aspect brings me to discussion of the 
cybernetic concept of self-organisation, in which the MU will, in some ways, play a decisive role. 
IV. Cybernetic Self-(Dis-)Organisation. Noise from Order 
Strictly speaking, cybernetic self-organisation fully enters the narrative of Libertatia only when the 
authors of the CCRU decide to engage in it, but already several relations and events constructed 
by previous voices can be said to be of great cybernetic significance. The first of them is the initial 
event on sea, which only just served as an example for the formation of anarchist self-organisation, 
but in order for this to become comprehensible it is important to mark at least three basic axioms 
characterising cybernetics in general. 
First of all, as opposed to anarchism, or many other philosophies, for that matter, cybernetics 
understands agents not in terms of subjects and objects and their internal structures, but in terms 
of systems and environments and the processes unfolding within systems as well as those 
unfolding between systems and environments. Adapting arguments from behaviouralism and 
technical engineering, cybernetics holds that, no matter if one has to do with a machine, an 
organism, or a community, the defining category of agency is that of a system continuously reacting 
to the effects of its own behaviour both inside it and between itself and the outside, the recursive 
mechanisms thus installed as feedback loops being supposed to guarantee the system’s stability 
over time (cf. for Wiener/Bigelow/Rosenblueth 1943). Secondly, the interactions within the system 
 
557 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
and between system and environment are conceptualised in terms of the interrelation of 
communication and control, which is to say that the better the information transfer within the 
feedback loops in the system or between system and environment, the less there is a chance of 
noise or information disorder undercutting control (cf. Wiener [1948] 2013). While this second 
aspect is clearly derived from communication and information theory, the third stems from the 
theory of thermodynamics, cybernetics namely having adopted specifically its second law 
according to which the entropy within an isolated system necessarily increases over time, entropy 
being the measure for the irreversibility of processes of temperature transfer from warm to cold, 
or, if very loosely translated into more applicable terms, the measure of the irreversible rise of 
noise or, again, disorder (cf. Wiener [1950] 1988).  
With that being said, the conflict on sea can be reevaluated as the event of a system, the Victoire, 
having had to face an interaction with another system from its environment, the English vessel, 
which resulted in an entropic increase of noise within that first system. More precisely, with all 
captains and lieutenants killed, the previous order of information aboard the ship was no longer 
in place, the rules of communication installed by the captains as well as the feedback channels 
from crew to captains and back had been undone, and thus the crew found itself in a situation of 
uncontrolled relations, which potentially threatened its existence.  
The cybernetic analysis of the subsequent formation of the “Republic of the Sea” on the very basis 
of such situation of noise demands for self-organisation to come into play specifically. Very briefly 
put, in the light of the theory of self-organisation presented by Heinz von Foerster in the 1960s, it 
can be stated that noise possesses its very own internal dynamic, and the surprising factor of this 
dynamic is that, without any external interference, it automatically tends to transform into 
relations of order, meaning that noise has the capacity to let order emerge from within itself, a 
principle that Heinz von Foerster gave the name of “order from noise” (Foerster [1959] 1981, 15; 
cf. also Mersch 2013). In this sense, it can be said that Mission and his crew’s invention of the new 
order of liberty was a form of self-organisation in that it emanated directly and precisely from the 
high level of noise having been caused aboard the ship. Without noise, there would not have been 
a new order. Importantly, one of the main differences between this and the anarchist concept of 
self-organisation is that the “self” in cybernetic self-organisation refers less to a subject, be it 
collective or individual, and more to the mechanical quality of a process. To an extent, the “self” in 
cybernetic self-organisation stands in for “by itself,” and in consequence, the entire anarchist 
paradox discussed under the notions of self-discipline and failure does not present itself in 
cybernetic terms—which is not to say, however, that no other paradoxes are involved. 
A properly cybernetic paradox starts to come into view by looking at yet another event from 
Libertatia that has been discussed before, namely Martin’s killing of the lemur and Mission’s 
reaction to it, a case that, from a cybernetic perspective, evokes Ashby’s experimentation with the 
homeostat from the late 1940s and 1950s (cf. Dany 2013, 52–56; Pickering 2005). The homeostat 
was a machine designed by Ashby in the interest of modelling the homeostatic mechanisms of the 
organism and particularly the human brain; a simple example of such organic mechanisms is the 
regulation of body temperature at a constant level via sweat. Very quickly described, the 
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homeostat’s technical architecture reproduced such mechanisms by transforming electric inputs 
into outputs while constantly maintaining a certain level of voltage inside it, thus making sure that 
a certain predefined order, a norm, or rather a certain interval corresponding to that norm was 
never exceeded. The latter aspect of a normative interval is also called meta-stability in cybernetics 
and can be traced back to its very early beginnings (cf. Vogl 2016), but Ashby’s work on the 
homeostat not only aimed at meta-stability, it aimed at “ultra-stability,” as Ashby termed it (cf. 
Ashby 1954), a state of equilibrium which was supposed to guarantee total control even if, for some 
reason, meta-stability was completely disturbed. The essential twist came from the introduction of 
a specific feedback mechanism into the machine: whenever the normative interval was 
transgressed through some random input drastically lowering or increasing the level of voltage, 
the homeostat automatically activated a relay which, by means of inverting the polarity of the 
electrical power or, for example, by modifying the resistance of the electrical circuit, immediately 
led to the restoration of order. And in case the first attempt at reestablishing inner balance was 
not a success, the relay mechanism simply got repeated until it finally was.  
The more general consequences of this experiment can be said to imply an extension or 
intensification of Foerster’s principle of “order from noise,” even if Ashby’s research historically 
preceded that of Foerster. In a nutshell, Ashby’s homeostat not just confirms the theory that 
information disorder can evoke order, but more than that, it shows how disorder can evoke order 
exactly via injecting even more disorder. Because that is what the homeostat is essentially about: 
whenever the order defined by a norm respectively a normative interval is being undone, the relay 
mechanically fights the caused disorder by inserting yet another dosage of disorder, which works 
by essentially neutralising the original shock. The extended definition of self-organisation that can 
be derived from that argument is that not only can disorder automatically create order, but in case 
of a disturbance of order, further disorder can automatically restore it. In the stories of Libertatia, 
the event of the murder of the lemur exemplifies just that, but only if regarded with respect to the 
OGU, which, in cybernetic terms, too can be perceived as a self-organising system: from the 
standpoint of the custodians of the future, the existence of the new system of Libertatia represents 
a momentum of disorder in the system of the OGU, and the way to control this deviation is to insert 
more disorder into the universe by having Martin kill the lemur, the calculation that this distraction 
and its further effects will eventually bring Libertatia down and inversely restore order within the 
OGU eventually playing out just like they thought.  
Having come this far, it again seems that the stories of Libertatia, also in the case of cybernetic self-
organisation, fulfil primarily the function of exemplification, and furthermore, it seems that they 
exemplify only how extremely flexible and rigid cybernetic self-organisation can be at the same 
time, even the paradox of fighting disorder with disorder leading only to more stability. Yet, just 
like with anarchist self-organisation, an essential detail from the narrative turns everything around, 
revealing suddenly how cybernetic self-organisation too is an inherently self-dis-organising 
process. The specific aspect in question is that, although the custodians of the future successfully 
managed to wipe out Libertatia and thus seemingly let the OGU re-organise itself, what they did 
not manage to undo was Mission’s excursions into the forests which made him engage in a new 
community with the lemurs. More to the point, it was only and precisely after Martin had killed the 
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lemur that Mission started to fully commit to a life in the forests, which invites the interpretation 
of there being a correlation between the two acts, a correlation in the sense that the intervention 
of the custodians, like a feedback mechanism gone wrong, unwillingly turned out to be the very 
impulse for or cause of Mission’s relation with the lemurs and, in consequence, also his stepping 
into the MU. Within the MU, in turn, both time and personal identity completely spiralled out of 
control, with circular recursions of time resulting in time rifts, which even made it possible to think 
of Mission and Burroughs as the two faces of one and the same person.  
All of this was caused or at least intensified by the intervention of the custodians of the future, a 
peculiar inconsistency which, against the backdrop of Foerster’s and Ashby’s concepts of cybernetic 
self-organisation, leads to the assumption that fighting disorder with disorder, although 
intermediately leading to a restoration of order—after all, Libertatia was indeed destroyed—
eventually invokes only further disorder—the flourishing of the MU. In other words, there is no 
creation of order without the simultaneous creation of more disorder, even if that order comes 
from fighting disorder with disorder. And interestingly enough, in some way, Foester’s theory of 
self-organisation anticipated just that, namely when, in strictly applying the second law of 
thermodynamics to processes in isolated systems, Foerster stated that: “if one assumes that [the 
adiabatic] envelope contains the self-organising system proper, this system turns out to be not 
only just a disorganizing system, but even a self-disorganizing system” ([1959] 1981, 4). In the case 
of the all-encompassing OGU as an isolated system, the blooming of the MU paradoxically situated 
within it equals exactly such entropic self-dis-organisation. Other social systems, which are 
generally non-isolated, might not be self-dis-organising in this strict sense, but they are still 
disorganising insofar as their generation of order creates disorder in their environment and thus 
a further potential for change. In sum, cybernetic self-organisation is the principle order from 
noise, but at the same time it is the principle of noise from order.  
V. The Curiosity for Panic. Vitalist-Materialist Conclusions 
Readdressing the original question of self-organisation and liberation, the stories of Libertatia so 
far have elucidated how both the anarchist and the cybernetic concept of self-organisation 
implicitly project its potentially liberating opposite of self-dis-organisation. In the case of Libertatia 
as a self-organised anarchist commune, Mission having given in to the impulse of sleep precisely 
when he was supposed to discipline himself in order to fulfil his obligations for the community 
indicated how anarchist self-organisation as a refusal to be ruled or rule implies self-dis-
organisation in the sense of refusing particularly internalised rule; in the case of the OGU as a self-
organising cybernetic system, Mission having been provoked to fully enter the world of the lemurs 
and the MU and thus increase the level of disorder within the OGU precisely by the custodians’ 
attempts to reinstall order within the OGU indicated how cybernetic self-organisation implies self-
dis-organisation in the sense that more order necessarily provokes more disorder. 
To conclude, I intend to add, just very briefly, a final reading of the tale of Libertatia as containing, 
in addition to anarchist and cybernetic self-organisation, a third option of vitalist-materialist self-
organisation, one of its decisive advantages over the other two being that it not just implies, but 
 
560 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
indeed rather embraces processes of self-dis-organisation, thus accentuating the liberating aspect 
of self-dis-organisation in perhaps its most obvious form. Not surprisingly, vitalist-materialist self-
organisation is present not so much in the commune of Libertatia or the system of the OGU, but 
in the forests, among the lemurs, and more precisely in the MU. Burroughs indicated the MU’s 
vitalist-materialist implications most clearly when, in describing how Mission went looking for the 
lemurs for the very first time, he wrote that “Captain Mission did not fear panic, the sudden, 
intolerable knowing that everything is alive” (1987, 50). This peculiar characterisation of panic was 
elsewhere expanded on when Burroughs alluded to its etymological roots of “panikós” and the 
Greek God Pan, the god of nature, the forests, and wildlife, who, in Burroughs’ own reasoning, 
further represented a world of multiple healing powers opposed to the Christian monopolisation 
of powers in the figure of Jesus Christ (cf. Burroughs 1991, 23–28). Thus, in stating that Mission did 
not fear panic, Burroughs portrayed his protagonist as someone who is open to or indeed actively 
seeking contact with the plural and wild powers of Pan, with the forces of life that reside 
everywhere, with the forces that, once he got in touch with them, might fundamentally change 
him. That is exactly what happened when Mission got to know the lemurs and decided to live with 
one of them, the relationship to his fellow Ghost equalling a form of self-organised inter-species 
living through which Mission’s life is transformed particularly by getting directed toward the radical 
processes of unorganised becoming in the MU. Borrowing from Johnson’s original characterisation 
of Mission as a man defined not least by his “Curiosity” (1728, 2), Mission’s lack of fear and his 
actions can ultimately be translated in terms of a curiosity for panic that proposes an ongoing 
becoming-other through the welcoming of the self-dis-organising powers of the self-organisation 
of forces. In the MU, self-organisation is no longer a matter of subjects or systems, but a matter of 
forces and their continuous merging and falling apart.  
This, at least, is what a vitalist-materialist interpretation on the basis of Félix Guattari and Donna 
Haraway might conclude, the latter, of course, not strictly being a vitalist materialist, but still 
definitely a materialist. Mission’s relationship with the lemur might serve as a prime case for 
Haraway’s reformulation of self-organisation, or auto-poiesis, in terms of sym-poiesis, a neologism, 
which she introduced in order to emphasise the primary relationality as well as the “making-with” 
and “becoming-with” in self-organisation, which included the possibility of unexpected change (cf. 
2016, 58–98). Interestingly, Haraway mentions a wildlife preservation project designed to aid the 
survival of lemurs in Madagascar as one example of human-animal sympoiesis (Ibid., 81–85). More 
fundamentally, though, it is Félix Guattari’s concept of auto-poiesis as chaosmosis that highlights 
the core consequences of a vitalist-materialist interpretation of self-organisation (cf. 1995, cf. also 
Braidotti 2013). In a critical reading of Francisco Varela’s auto-poiesis according to which the 
concept defines the machine’s capacity to produce and reproduce its own organisation as well as 
its regulating limits and thresholds, Guattari derives the immanence of auto-poiesis, which has it 
that every process of formation is always already pregnant with the forces of disorder or chaos 
ready to dissolve it: “Formations of sense and states of things are thus chaotised in the very 
movement of the bringing into existence of their complexity. At the source of a world’s constitution 
there is always a certain modality of chaotic discomfort in its organicity, functionality and relations 
of alterity” (1995, 80–81). This chaosmosis of auto-poiesis lets self-dis-organisation appear as a co-
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originary force independently of which self-organisation never exists, a quality of the chaotic 
relations of forces that inscribes change in every order and that one cannot but affirm.  
Mission’s curiosity for panic is exactly this affirmation, it is a life within the immanence of  
self-(dis-)organisation. Not just in the MU, but in the entire narrative of Libertatia, his character is 
itself nothing but a self-(dis-)organising force: he was involved in every self-formation of order only 
to open up escape routes that led to further self-dis-organisation, from the “Republic of the Sea” 
to Libertatia to the life in the forest to, ultimately, the Sea, which meant his death or perhaps yet 
another life. He was the actualisation of a voice which, as Burroughs noted, repeated “‘[o]ut, and 
under, and out, and out’” (1987, 54) in his head, a voice, a ghost, perhaps, or a vector, a movement 
constantly driving for change. Similarly, the stories of Libertatia, in a more abstract sense of a 
dramaturgy of reiterations, are also but a continuous process of self-organisation and self-dis-
organisation, with every new author altering it from within, with every new draft adding to the 
previous one and so further liberating its forces. From the liberated ship that, in Johnson, was still 
guided by the Lord, to the abandonment of God’s influence via Burroughs, to the settling of the 
liberty lovers on land and the subsequent destruction of the colony of Libertatia which only 
reinforced the creation of the connection to the lemurs, to the introduction of the MU and chaotic 
time rifts in the CCRU, the narrative of Libertatia transformed with every new turn. The writings of 
the stories of Libertatia themselves performed the curiosity for panic as a constant affirmation of 
self-(dis-)organisation, and far from of having come to an ultimate end, the process is only waiting 
to be continued in the future.  
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